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1  Introduction  
 
Climate change is emerging as one of the biggest challenges confronting the sustainability of 
our planet, affecting the development prospects of both developed and developing countries. 
There is a global effort to find solutions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the 
cause of climate change, by altering patterns of socioeconomic development. Although there 
is limited progress in international negotiations, there have been sustained efforts by the 
major contributors of GHG emissions to find solutions to reduce emissions. Since the signing 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1992, emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil have joined 
ranks with the developed economies as leading emitters of GHGs. As a result, emerging 
literature and policy discourses have started focusing on the role of emerging powers to 
tackle this challenge (Patrick 2010; Bailey and Compston 2012). Most of the existing 
literature on the role of emerging economies focuses on understanding the role of the ‘global 
South’ in international negotiations and global climate politics. However, there is now a 
separate strand of literature that focuses on understanding the domestic policy and politics of 
climate change in emerging economies (Hallding et al. 2011; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012).  
A comprehensive understanding of domestic climate policy requires dealing with the different 
stages of policy cycle from policy formulation to policy implementation. Like any other 
policymaking process, it entails complicated negotiations and compromise (Kingdon and 
Thurber 1984). There are different actors involved at the different stages of the policy cycle 
and these actors have divergent interests. This makes the policy formulation and 
implementation landscape complex. Given the complex nature of climate policy 
implementation, we use political economy analysis to answer the core question: who 
drives/obstructs climate change policies in the rising powers? We study the case of China, 
focusing on renewable energy development. This focus is due to two reasons. First, 
renewable energy can make a large and critical contribution to mitigating climate change by 
substituting for the use of fossil fuels. Second, China has emerged as a global leader in 
renewable energy supply in a relatively short period of time. As a result, the lessons from a 
political economy analysis of who drives and who obstructs renewable energy development 
in China would be relevant for policymakers as well as other stakeholders interested in the 
renewable energy development globally.  
In China, climate policy formulation is centralised and most policy decisions are taken by the 
national government. Since 2006, the Chinese government has promoted the concept of 
‘climate friendly development’. Accepted as a part of the basic national development strategy 
at the central level, this concept emphasises balancing the twin goals of reducing GHG 
emissions and preserving economic growth rate. Most existing studies focus on analysing 
the policy development and formulation at the central level. However, developing a 
comprehensive understanding of climate change policy requires dealing with aspects of 
policy formulation as well as policy implementation. In China, there is a great deal of 
decentralisation in policy implementation. Most of the policy implementation is the 
responsibility of provincial and city governments (Lieberthal 1997). This is where climate-
related policies encounter implementation gaps (Chan et al. 1995; Lo, Fryxell and Wong 
2006; Ma and Ortolano 2000; Schwartz 2003; Swanson, Kuhn and Xu 2001; Kostka and Mol 
2013). Yet the local level is less well understood. This study attempts to fill the gap in the 
existing literature by developing two detailed case studies on renewable energy development 
from the stage of policy formulation to implementation. The two case studies, on solar 
photovoltaics (PV) and wind technology, examine the role of stakeholder interests in driving 
or obstructing the implementation of national policies.  
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It is worth noting that due to the diversity of actors and interests, local implementation has 
become more complicated in China than before. This is partly driven by a proliferation of 
actors responsible for the implementation of policies at the local level. The implementation of 
climate policies is managed by multiple actors within local government and by specialised 
climate change-related local agencies. As a result, collaboration among specialised agencies 
and local governments has become essential for effective implementation of policy (Zhan, Lo 
and Tang 2014). However, Lieberthal (1997) points out the potential for conflict between the 
specialised local agencies and local government. The local agencies responsible for 
implementing climate change policies might have relatively less power than the local 
governments whose mandate is to promote economic development policies, such as 
industrial policy. The need for collaboration for effective implementation between actors with 
divergent priorities is a challenge for effective climate policy implementation in China.  
At the same time, the space for innovation in interpreting national-level policies as well as 
discretion in policy implementation has expanded. For example, the Chinese central 
government has a national goal to reduce carbon emission intensity by 40–45 per cent in 
2050. Under this umbrella policy, some local governments actively encouraged renewable 
energy manufacture, some focused on renewable energy deployment, while some asked for 
higher levels of carbon emission intensity by arguing that they were still in a nascent stage of 
industrialisation and would need a higher emission cap (Qi 2011). The example shows that a 
higher degree of flexibility can be observed at the local level, compatible with local 
socioeconomic conditions, to explore suitable implementation methods for climate-related 
policies. 
It is well established that China has a unified top-down system of policy design and 
implementation in which people’s delegates represent stakeholders in major law making. The 
day-to-day decisions on policy interpretation and implementation are made by the local 
government and public servants. However, climate change policies cannot be implemented 
solely by the government machinery. Effective implementation requires the participation of all 
stakeholders who are responsible for climate change and can contribute to addressing it. A 
key actor in addressing climate change is local business. In China, industrial emissions 
account for over 75 per cent of the total carbon emissions; therefore, effective climate action 
required a shift from high-carbon industries to low-carbon industries (Dai 2009; Heggelund 
Andresen and Buan 2010). As a result, the industrial sector and its political representatives 
have been actively involved in this process of resource reallocation. Another key actor is the 
local citizenry. Climate actions are highly relevant to their daily life as they depend on the 
citizens’ adoption and usage of low-carbon technologies. With rising levels of public 
awareness and increasing public participation in the policymaking process, disregarding the 
concerns of local citizens might generate strong opposition to policy decisions and delay the 
implementation process (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh 2007; Fleishman, De 
Bruin and Morgan 2010). In recent years, climate experts have increasingly played a crucial 
role in providing knowledge and consultancy for climate policy decisions. The existing 
literature recognises the role of these experts in the local decision process, but the process 
in which they influence local implementation is still unclear (Zhu 2009a, 2009b). The analysis 
of local implementation of climate policies needs to engage with these key stakeholders who 
have been increasingly involved in climate governance through regular interaction with the 
local governments. 
Given the complex nature of climate governance driven by the diversity of actors and 
interests at various levels, detailed empirical analysis is critical to develop a nuanced 
understanding of who drives and who obstructs the local implementation of climate-related 
policies. This study examines the multiple local stakeholders and their interests who are 
involved in implementing the climate policies formulated by the central government. Focusing 
on renewable energy policy implementation at the local (city) level, the paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and identifies the key actors in Chinese 
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renewable energy and their motivations to drive or obstruct policy implementation. Section 3 
introduces the research methodology and case study selection criteria. In Sections 4 and 5, 
the paper presents the two case studies – photovoltaic and wind energy – including a 
detailed analysis of the interest of the stakeholders involved in policy implementation. 
Section 6 presents the conclusions of the paper. 
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2  Literature review  
 
This chapter has a dual purpose: to provide contextual information on China and to identify 
the key actors and their motives from the existing literature. 
2.1  Chinese renewable energy development and policy 
implementation 
As a developing country, China was not listed as an Annex 1 country in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Therefore, it did not have an international obligation of cutting down emissions in accordance 
with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Yet with 
rapid economic growth, China encountered severe environmental degradation. At the same 
time, China overtook the United States as the largest emitter of GHG (US EPA 2013). 
International political pressure combined with rising domestic concerns due to severe 
environmental degradation pushed the Chinese government to adopt a national strategy in 
response to climate change. The climate policy suite contained a wide range of policy 
instruments that included financial, industrial, science and technology, market stimulation, 
energy and environment policies. Among all of these, renewable energy policy played a 
significant role (Urban, Nordensvärd and Zhou 2012).  
The policy initiatives in renewable energy have been a catalyst for rapid growth in the wind 
and solar energy sectors. In 2013, China had a 28.7 per cent share of the global cumulative 
installed capacity and ranked the first in the world, while India ranked fifth in terms of 
cumulative capacity (WWEA 2014). China produced over 50 per cent of the global solar cells 
in 2010. Although it has experienced a slow-down since, the Chinese government still plans 
to have 35GW solar power installed capacity by 2015. This would be a sevenfold increase on 
the installed capacity at the end of 2012. 
The impressive growth of the renewable energy sector notwithstanding, there were several 
challenges that were encountered by the actors involved in the implementation of these 
policies. The first set of challenges was due to the divergence between the priorities of the 
sub-national and national government (or local–central relationship). Although the national 
government was responsible for mainstreaming climate change mitigation and adaptation 
into the national development strategy, it was the sub-national government or local 
government that would turn these national policies into reality (Harrison and Kostka 2012; 
Teng 2012). The conflict between the two is hardly news. Any central policy that would harm 
the local benefits might encounter implementation obstacles. For example, Kang et al. (2012) 
pointed out that there were uncoordinated policy goals between central and local 
governments. This lack of coordination is exemplified by the rapid development of wind farms 
at the local level without adequate provisions made for grid connectivity at the national level. 
Solangi et al. (2011) found that Chinese local governments should have a focus on solar 
utilisation (e.g. operation and maintenance) and make medium- and long-term plans to reach 
this goal. However, there were no incentives for the achievement of these goals (Zhang et al. 
2009). 
The second set of implementation challenges emanated from the specificities of the sector. 
The energy sector became very important for rapid economic development and was a major 
contributor to GHG emissions. Under the pressure of increasing coal costs, national 
electricity shortage and high tariff rate, traditional energy industries (e.g. the coal mining 
industry and the national grid) were facing great challenges, although they continued to be 
the primary players. At the same time, new stakeholders, including actors promoting 
renewable energy, were entering the energy domain at a fast speed (La Rovere and Poppe 
2012; Tongia 2007). The conflict between the interests of the incumbents and the new 
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entrants was a source of challenge leading to difficulties for renewable energy to connect to 
the grid (Wang 2012).  
Owing to contextual difference, the existing literature focusing on policy instruments and 
experiences of renewable energy in a developed country does not readily lend itself to 
analysing the Chinese case. This is due to two reasons. On the one hand, the Chinese 
renewable energy sector experienced a ‘reversed’ development sequence as compared to 
the developed country experience: it relied on massive manufacture and exportation first and 
then reached the stage of domestic deployment. In addition, it acquired core technology via 
technology import, licensing and acquisition rather than from basic research and 
development (R&D). This sequence called for a different combination of policy tools and 
implementation skills. On the other hand, Chinese wind and solar policies were designed and 
implemented at an unprecedented pace along with a dramatic industry development pace, 
which left little room for deliberate policy analysis. This experience was unique and cannot be 
explained by the existing literature on policy implementation. This present study fills this gap 
in the existing literature through a detailed empirical study enhancing the understanding of 
implementation behaviour in the Chinese renewable energy area.  
2.2  Key policies to promote Chinese renewable energy 
development 
The Chinese government has created a wide array of policies to address the impacts of 
climate change. By 2010, there were 24 energy policies and 18 innovation policies designed 
in response to climate change. As a result of this focus, renewable energy, particularly wind 
and solar energy, has played a key role in GHG emission reduction. National-level support 
for renewable energy development through these policies has increasingly gained 
importance in recent years with the enunciation of clear national goals to increase their share 
in the total energy consumption to 15 per cent by 2020.  
According to Matland (1995), policy implementation effort is greatly influenced by the clarity 
of a policy and whether it creates conflict or cooperation between actors involved in its 
implementation. With different degrees of policy ambiguity and conflict, policy implementation 
would have varying degrees of success. Therefore, we categorise Chinese climate-related 
policies into two groups: broad strategic policies with vague goals; and detailed regulations, 
programmes and projects with clear goals. Broad strategic policies include national goals, 
five-year plans, strategic planning and policies without detailed description of measures to be 
undertaken. The first step in the implementation of such policies by the local governments is 
to reinterpret these broad strategic policies into detailed and feasible regulations and/or 
standards. The advantage of the strategic policies lies in the fact that local governments 
have a certain degree of discretion in localising the policy according to their particular 
context. This is especially important when there are widely varying local contexts due to 
uneven economic development in the different regions. For example, the level of government 
subsidy supporting the development renewable energy industry might vary according to the 
local economic development level. However, as a result of the contextual specificities, the 
strategic policies may bear the risk that local governments interpret them in radically different 
ways, creating a space for conflict between those who formulate the policy and those who 
implement them. 
Distinct from the broad strategies and policies, the Chinese government also developed 
detailed regulations, programmes and projects with clear targets, standards and timelines for 
implementation. For example, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
promoted a 10GW wind farm base construction project clearly indicating the key elements of 
installed capacity, construction standards and construction timeframe. In such cases, the 
local governments did not have to reinterpret the policy during the implementation stage. 
Although such clearly defined top-down projects benefit from clarity in design, they may 
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generate additional challenges. For instance, the implementation process of such projects 
would suffer if they do not take into account the contextual specificities of the different 
regions. In addition, these target-driven projects do not provide the local implementation 
entities with the necessary discretion for experimentation and might lead to efficiency losses 
as a result. 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the two types of policies defined above within all climate-
related policies in China. In the energy policy arena, more strategic policies were designed, 
which inevitably generated a greater extent of implementation discretion at the local level. 
Figure 2.1  Policies separated into the categories of ‘detailed policy’ and 
‘strategic plan’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic policies promoting renewable energy included policies such as the Renewable 
Energy Law of P.R. China (2006, 2009), Mid- and Long-Term Planning for Renewable 
Energy (2007), Measure on Supervision of Power-Grid Enterprise Purchases of Full Amount 
of Renewable Energy Electricity (2007); and the 10th, 11th and 12th Five-Year plans for new 
and renewable energy (2001, 2008, 2013 respectively). The most important policy initiative in 
the Chinese context was the introduction of the Renewable Energy Law in 2006, an umbrella 
regulation for renewable energy development in China. It not only emphasised the 
importance of renewable energy development as a national strategy, but also assigned 
responsibilities to the different administrative units, making them in charge of technological 
development, standard setting, grid connection, developing feed-in tariffs, renewable energy 
industry development and creation of a national renewable energy fund. All the other policies 
and combination of policies were covered and guided by this law. 
Detailed policies for renewable energy promotion included policies such as Interim Measures 
on Special Fund Management for Development of Renewable Energy (2006), Pursuant to 
the Circular Abolishing the Requirement on the Rate of Localisation of Equipment 
Procurement on Wind Power Projects (2009) and a series of programmes to approve local 
wind price (in Heilongjiang and other places) as well as a series of programmes made by 
NDRC and the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) on renewable energy 
subsidy, the grid connection project and quota treatment. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Innovation
policy
Industry policy Financial policy Environmental
policy
Energy policy
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
p
o
lic
ie
s
Detailed regulations and standards Strategy and policy
11 
 
2.3  Climate policy formulation at central level  
2.3.1  Organisational structure of climate policy design at central level 
Although China is still discussing its Climate Change Law in 2014, the national strategy 
towards climate mitigation started from the early 1990s. Right after the adoption of the 
UNFCCC in New York, the Standing Committee of Chinese People’s Congress (SCCPC) 
approved the legal status of the UNFCCC in China. The State Council approved the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2002. China built up its climate policy framework under the umbrella of these 
international agreements.  
In 1990, China established the National Climate Change Coordination Group directed by the 
Environmental Protection Commission (EPC) under the State Council as the national 
counterpart to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It was renamed the 
National Climate Change Coordination Committee during the national institutional reforms in 
1998 and was assigned the task of coordinating among different ministries. The major task of 
this committee is to communicate the status of activities initiated on climate change and draw 
up the national climate change action plans. For instance, the committee publishes the 
National Communication on Climate Change, which reports on national GHG inventories, 
climate change impacts and adaptation, mitigation of climate change-related policies and 
measures, climate observation and research, education and public awareness, finance, 
technology and capacity building requirements, etc. As climate change mitigation gained 
priority in the national strategy, the committee was upgraded to the National Leading Group 
to Address Climate Change and Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction 
(NLGACCECER) under the direct leadership of Premier Wen Jiabao.  
The NLGACCECER leads both international negotiations and domestic climate actions. As 
the highest-level organisation in climate mitigation in China, its members include leaders 
from 21 key players, including the State Council (SC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 
NDRC, Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry of Health, National Bureau of Statistics, State 
Forestry Administration, Chinese Academy of Science, China Meteorological Administration, 
National Energy Administration (NEA), Civil Aviation Administration and State Oceanic 
Administration. 
The daily tasks of NLGACCECER were implemented by offices in the NDRC and MEP, 
responsible for climate mitigation through emission reduction. However, when the NDRC set 
up the Department of Climate Change in 2008, major administration tasks were centralised 
and a series of climate actions and policy designs were proposed under its leadership. 
2.3.2  Climate change policy framework at the central level 
At the central level, climate policy goals are set via several key policies. In 2004, China 
started publishing climate change data in the The People’s Republic of China Initial National 
Communication on Climate Change report to fulfil its obligations under the UNFCCC 
(National Committee on Climate Change 2004). In 2005, China initiated its first mitigation 
actions through a programme promoting Measures for Operation and Management of Clean 
Development Mechanism Projects in China (NDRC, MoST, MoF and MoFA 2005). Up to    
23 October 2014, the NDRC approved a total number of 5,059 Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) applications.1 Another milestone was reached in 2007 when China 
announced its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NDRC 2007a). The action plan 
                                               
1 Data source: CDM China website, http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn. 
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outlined policies and measures China would adopt, and clarified its basic stance on global 
warming. The plan also placed the Chinese strategy of climate mitigation under the 
framework of sustainable development. In other words, China would try to alter its economic 
growth pattern through methods such as industrial structure adjustment, renewable energy 
development, and population control.2 China further detailed its policy goals in 2009 to 
reduce its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40 per cent 
to 45 per cent in 2020 compared with 2005.  
Following the announcement of the action plan in 2007, the different ministries started 
announcing climate policies in their domains. Focusing on climate technology improvement 
and innovation, the MoST, along with 13 other ministries and research institutes, announced 
the Special Scientific Action Plans Addressing Climate Change Issues (MoST et al. 2007). In 
this document, MoST not only set out goals to be achieved in the area of climate technology, 
but also outlined three key categories: scientific challenges arising due to climate change, 
technologies for climate mitigation, and technologies for adaptation. Strategic solutions listed 
in the action plan included increasing R&D investment in climate change, building platforms 
that support R&D, urging collaboration and attracting talent from all over the world. Climate-
related technologies were also listed as key research areas in the national Mid–Long Term 
Science And Technology Development Plan in 2006 (MoST 2006). The MoST had three 
priorities related to climate change: (1) to expand R&D investment: according to the MoST, 
China invested more than 10bn yuan RMB on climate research during the 11th Five-Year 
Plan; (2) to further develop the strategic emerging industry; and (3) to reform the scientific 
management mechanism to allow for interdisciplinary collaboration, attract talent and 
encourage a problem-oriented flexible support mechanism.3 
The NDRC was in charge of national planning and promoting economic development. In the 
area of climate change, reducing GHG emissions and fulfilling the national target of 
sustainable development was its main policy goal. Its action plan for climate change mainly 
focused on providing macro-level policy guidance, demonstration projects, standards setting 
and managing projects (for example, the CDM project).  
In China, most GHG emissions result from the industrial sector. As a result, any reduction of 
GHG emissions would depend on readjustments in the industrial sector. To adjust the 
industry structure, between 2006 and 2008 China shut down outdated technology (luo hou 
chan neng) with production capacity of 60.59 million tons of iron, 43.47 million tons of steel, 
140 million tons of cement, and 64.45 million tons of coke. China also incentivised the growth 
of the low GHG intensive service sector, which expanded from 31.8 per cent in 1990 to      
40.1 per cent in 2008.  
To adjust the national energy structure, the NDRC and the National Bureau of Energy 
announced the Mid–Long Term Renewable Energy Development Plan in 2007 (NDRC 
2007b), and set a target of 15 per cent of the total energy consumption from renewable 
energy by 2020. By stimulating nuclear, hydropower, solar and wind development, China is a 
global leader in all these four areas. 
The NDRC set out the national standards for GHG emissions by announcing the start of the 
provincial GHG emissions inventory preparation in 2010. This regulation was the first step in 
building capacities among the provinces in China for a nationwide Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS). Carbon trading markets were initiated in seven cities by 2014. 
Although domestic politics played a decisive role, huge pressure for climate change 
regulations came from international sources. Therefore, the MoFA played an important role 
                                               
2 http://baike.baidu.com/view/1336873.htm (in Chinese). 
3 Data source: speech by Wan Gang, the minister of the MoST at the kick-off meeting of Scientific and Technological Projects in 
Response to Climate Change, www.weather.com.cn/static/html/article/20100303/198317.shtml (in Chinese). 
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in climate policymaking and implementation in China. The major goal for the MoFA was to 
protect China’s right to development at international negotiations and at the same time 
canvass the path of sustainable development being implemented in China.  
The MEP, whose main task is environmental protection, contributed to climate change 
mitigation through adjustments in pollution standards, environment monitoring, supporting 
the environmental protection industry, as well as promoting energy saving and emission 
reduction programmes. 
It is worth noting that the majority of the climate change policies were announced jointly by 
the ministries mentioned above, including the NDRC, MoST, MoF, MEP and MoFA and other 
relevant ministries. Yet, each policy was designated to one ministry for the sake of 
implementation, and therefore, was marked with different policy goals embedded in each 
minister’s target. This may cause implementation obstacles from conflicting goals. For 
example, NDRC promoted the carbon trade mechanism to fulfil the climate change mitigation 
goal, while the MIIT preferred to build the renewable energy industry and nuclear industry as 
its response. The MoST, on the other hand, promoted electronic vehicles owing to its 
preference for this particular technology.  
2.3.3  Policy implementation obstacles at local level 
Although the different ministries introduced a number of policies in response to climate 
change, this well-designed policy system constantly encountered implementation obstacles, 
especially at the local level (i.e. city and county level).  
The local governments were monitored on climate policies by the State Council as well as by 
the different ministries. Through the Party channels, local government officials followed Party 
and State Council direction. In the climate mitigation area, national strategy and emphasis on 
green development flowed top-down via this channel. However, local bureaus were also 
responsible for the implementation of policy diktats from the line ministries. Therefore, 
different policy goals as well as a desire for self-promotion mingled in the course of climate 
policy implementation. This generated two implementation obstacles. 
First, climate policy implementation involves systemic adjustments and implementation of 
technologies that require an understanding of multiple disciplines; it is therefore complicated 
by nature. This is compounded by the fact that policies designed by different ministries 
emphasised different policy goals. For example, goals for energy saving and emission 
reduction have been embedded in detailed regulations both in the transportation area and in 
building standards but with different levels of implementation difficulties. For the achievement 
of transportation energy saving, ‘the fuel economy standards could be checked in the design 
and manufacturing of the motor vehicles. It is much easier to standardise and make sure the 
same type of car has exactly the same performance’, but it is different and more difficult to 
implement the building energy efficiency standards because ‘[they] should be reflected and 
implemented in the construction process and/or in the operational process, the 
implementation is very strenuous, and wastes a lot of resources’ (Interview with EX4). The 
lack of implementation capacities together with less professional guidance to local 
governments sometimes led to perverse behavior. For example, some local governments 
even allowed downtime, power cuts and other extreme measures to meet the requirement of 
the energy efficiency goal, which fully reflects the (sometimes irrational) distortion of policy 
implementation at the local level. 
Second, local government is more incentivised to pursue the goals of economic development 
as compared to low-carbon development under the current cadre evaluation system. Among 
the evaluation scores in Baoji, Shaanxi Province, in 2012, the total score of criteria for 
evaluation related to economic development was 32, while similar scores for low-carbon 
development added up to 3 (Qi 2014). Therefore, combining the goals of climate mitigation 
with economic development encountered obvious barriers at the implementation level by the 
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local cadres. According to Qi (2014), 27 provinces out of 31 failed to meet the energy saving 
target set by the NDRC during the 11th Five-Year Plan.  
As mentioned above, the local implementers also have substantial discretion in the 
interpretation of central climate policy. For example, in the 10 Cities, 1,000 Units project, 
MoST, NDRC, MIIT and MoF jointly invested about US$2.5bn aimed at establishing ten pilot 
areas and promoting 10,000 electronic vehicles (EVs) for three years. Private EV purchase 
was encouraged, but the main target of the project was public transport and government 
service cars. The bidding rules for the purchase of vehicles varied from city to city. Cities with 
local EV producers allowed bidding by local producers, thereby lowering the efficiency of the 
project. Some cities relied on the public transport company for the purchase and operation of 
EV buses but lost profits due to the lack of motivation of the state-owned transport company. 
Cities with strong connections with the grid tried the battery exchange model, while others 
adopted a plug-in infrastructure model.  
In summary, the discussion above suggests that although the Chinese central government 
designed a series of climate policies, these policies encountered several implementation 
barriers at the local level. This is due both to the complexity of the problem and to the 
emergence of new stakeholders. Multiple interests mingled with climate policy 
implementation making the policies difficult to execute on the ground. The following sections 
elaborate on the key stakeholders and their interests. 
2.4  Key actors and drivers of policy implementation  
For each policy, the six levels of governments in China – central, provincial, city, district, 
town and village – together with other stakeholders were involved in the implementation 
process. Existing literature usually combines the latter five levels under the nomenclature of 
the local government. For most policies, detailed implementation, including policy 
reinterpretation or resource allocation, happens largely at the provincial or city level. Local 
governments below city level are normally regarded as pure implementation agencies with 
no authority to modify policy. For renewable energy development, particularly wind and solar 
energy, existing literature has identified some of the key actors.  
At central level, the highest legislative body of the country is the National People’s Congress 
where all the laws and regulations are passed. As mentioned above, the State Council, 
together with different ministries, such as the NDRC, MoST, MoF, MEP, MoFA, MIIT and 
MOFCOM, designed strategic policies as well as detailed policies for developing the sector.  
At local level, most of the existing literature focuses on the provincial government. As the 
highest level of the implementation system, provincial government aims at creating 
incentives for local production as well as for local policy design. For example, it is 
responsible for the design of feed-in tariffs for wind energy in accordance with the local 
economic conditions as well as the local price of fossil fuel-based electricity. 
However, for most Chinese scholars, city governments are the real implementer of central 
policies for two reasons. First, city governments are directly responsible for the delivery of 
public services, such as education and public health. Further, they are responsible for 
stimulating private sector investment and production. They are also the responsible entities 
for job settlement and tax collection. Local economic development and local public service 
delivery interact with each other directly at the city level. Second, city-level cadres are 
evaluated and promoted with written targets, such as local GDP, emission reduction target 
fulfilment and local taxation increase. But promotion and evaluation at provincial level has 
less correlation with these written targets. This makes city-level governments focus more on 
detailed policy targets and play a critical role in the implementation of renewable energy 
policy.  
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Firms, both domestic and international, produce the equipment, engage in R&D projects, and 
operate the wind farms or solar farms. Large firms are also directly or indirectly involving into 
the policymaking process. For example, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) helped the NDRC 
to set up new standards for wind turbines in 2013. 
Besides government actors, the involvement of international organisations, international 
funding and new mechanisms of international negotiations are creating the space for a range 
of actors who are active in the development and implementation of climate policy. In 
analysing climate policy in emerging countries such as China, it is not enough to consider 
domestic stakeholders. Rather, the inclusion of international actors, both state and non-state, 
would help governments of these countries generate a ‘rooted understanding’ of their own 
climate strategies and policies (Fischer 2012). 
Therefore, it is essential to identify the key players and recognise their motivations. Existing 
studies explain the motives of the national and provincial governments. Implementation at 
city government level has not been dealt with to the same extent. On the basis of a 
description of the multiple actors involved in policy implementation, we further unpack the 
key research question of who drives the implementation of renewable energy in China into 
the two following questions: 
1. Who are the key/emerging players responsible for renewable energy development, 
and what are their interests? 
2. How do the interactions between these actors with several interests influence the 
renewable energy policy implementation in China?  
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3  Research design and data collection 
3.1  Methodology 
A three-step procedure was designed to answer the above two research questions. Figure 
3.1 illustrates the research logic and process.  
The central challenge in understanding China’s climate action was to understand and deal 
with its complexity. There were many different types of actors: they came from government, 
business and civil society. They operated at different levels: local, national and global. They 
had different priorities: climate change mitigation, energy security, competitiveness or job 
creation. There were competing narratives. And the policy process had different stages.  
The first stage of the research was to list Chinese policies related to climate change. The 
inventory included policies and agreements that dealt explicitly with reducing carbon 
emissions and climate-relevant policies, notably those concerning the renewable energy 
sector. Policy documents were traced and reviewed to give an overview of the explicit 
ambitions for low-carbon development. At this stage, the review focused on the timeline of 
policy formulation and adoption rather than implementation or monitoring. Due to the large 
number of policies in this area, the research then focused on a particular case and narrowed 
the policies down to those that were relevant and representative. For example, we selected 
one key policy that dominated Chinese solar energy development between 2009 and 2012 
as the major policy to be analysed. 
At the same time, the actors that had an influence on the particular policy were identified. 
According to the type of organisation, stakeholders were grouped as government, business 
and civil society and further classified depending on whether they operate at the sub-
national, national or international level. The research was based on secondary literature and 
trial interview information to identify the relevant stakeholders. Primary interviews were 
conducted with the relevant stakeholders. Snowball sampling methods were used to ensure 
that no important stakeholders were left out.  
Any successful policy, or policy implementation, depended on the effectiveness of the 
coalitions involved in implementing the policy. A successful coalition represented 
reconcilable relationships between stakeholders (Peiffer 2012). Thus, a higher level of 
reconcilable interests ensured an effective coalition. The research explicitly analysed 
different interests and preferences of each stakeholder. It should be noted that each 
stakeholder might have several and divergent interests. And there might be several coalitions 
formed during the policy implementation process. The complexity of the coalition formation 
and its evolution contributed to the complexity of the policy implementation process, and to 
the variety of results emanating from it. 
Basing our analysis on the interviews with stakeholders had certain limitations. First, self-
reported interests would be biased even if we adjusted the result by asking all stakeholders 
to evaluate others’ interests. Second, our research was based on ex post interviews that 
were undertaken three years after the policy had been launched and implemented. As a 
result, there would be information distortion even if the stakeholders tried their best to be 
unbiased.  
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Figure 3.1  Research design 
3.2  Case selection criteria 
We adopted two criteria for case selection. First, the cases selected needed to be 
representative of Chinese climate policymaking or implementation. As shown in Section 2.1, 
energy policy was the major policy area China concentrated on in response to climate 
change. Within energy policy, policies aimed at promoting renewable energy were quite 
dominant. Starting from the 10th Five-Year Plan (implemented between 2001 and 2005), 
China started to focus on solar energy and wind energy as part of the national strategic plan 
and experienced rapid growth in these two areas. Each area started from an inception 
phase, experienced fast growth, faced market turbulence and experienced several policy 
adjustments. The rich stories in each area makes them ideal case studies that illustrate 
historical changes in the policy area. 
Second, the selected cases needed to contain the necessary range of stakeholders with 
divergent interests and influences on the policy process. As mentioned above, along with the 
rapid development of renewable energy, many stakeholders became involved in renewable 
energy fields. Central government was a key stakeholder purposing its developmental 
philosophy change to green economy. Many local governments were eager to include 
renewable energy in local strategic framework. Some encouraged the development of local 
manufactures (e.g. Baoding, Xuzhou) while others stimulated large-scale deployment 
projects (e.g. Jiuquan, Daban city). Equipment manufacturers, developers and operators of 
wind/solar farms were closely tied to local development strategies. The real policy 
implementation process was influenced by all relevant stakeholders. 
The report selected one case each from solar and wind energy. The solar case focused on 
the Golden Sun Project while the wind case focused on the 10GW wind farm base 
construction project. Although there was only one core policy presented in each case, there 
existed an entire policy system that drove the implementation of the policy in each case. As 
illustrated in Section 2.1, China started to develop climate policies from different 
perspectives, including energy policy, financial policy, industry policy and science and 
technology. Therefore, in each case, several policies worked together during the 
implementation process. For example, both solar and wind energy industries were influenced 
by the Renewable Energy Law of 2006 and the taxation deduction policy designed for high-
technology industry. Our analysis of the cases was based on the combined result of all these 
policies that had an impact on the implementation of the projects. It was critical to include the 
Inventory of policies 
Policy action analysis 
Inventory of stakeholders 
Stakeholder interests 
analysis 
Mapping stakeholders 
according to influence 
Coalitions for 
changes 
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impact of the various policies because the stakeholders’ interests, as well as their power to 
influence the implementation, were affected by these different policies.  
It is worth noting at this stage a limitation of our research. Both the solar project and the wind 
project started in 2009. The solar project ended in 2013 but the wind project is still ongoing. 
Demonstrable policy results exist. However, there is no consensus on whether these projects 
were successful or not. Given that the main purpose of the research was to map the 
influence within the policy process rather than setting standards for policy evaluation, the 
case selection would serve their purpose. However, generalisation of the results should be 
limited only to the political economy analysis. 
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4  Case I: Chinese photovoltaics 
4.1  Background information on the Golden Sun Project 
The Golden Sun Project started in 2009 and ended in 2013. This was the first large-scale 
market exploration policy for Chinese photovoltaic technology and was, therefore, important 
for the development of the industry. The project was designed especially to support ‘solar 
demonstration in different areas and the industrialisation of its core technologies’ via financial 
support from the Renewable Energy Special Fund. The project was co-managed by the MoF, 
MoST and NDRC. The first batch of the project had three programme application areas: grid-
connected rooftop, building-integrated photovoltaic (BIPV) and ground mounted systems. For 
off-grid systems, only remote rural areas were covered in the programme. Therefore, off-grid 
did not become the main object of the programme both in terms of importance of the 
technology and the scale of deployment. The programme stipulated that projects with a scale 
larger than 300kW were eligible for the subsidy. The subsidy was designed to be larger for 
an off-grid system, covering 70 per cent of the construction cost. For grid-connected 
systems, on-site consumption was encouraged. However, excess electricity could be sold 
back to the utility. Buy-back rates were based on local benchmark coal-fired grid price.  
4.1.1  Project implementation  
The project was implemented in two stages, with a significant policy adjustment in the 
middle. The original policy plan was announced in 2009. The central government provided a 
subsidy covering 50 per cent of the total construction cost of a solar farm greater than 300kW 
in scale constructed within a year with an expected operation period of at least 20 years. 
With this subsidy, solar farm developers could shorten the payback time from 20 years to 
about 10 years (Interview F1). Policy designers believed this policy could greatly encourage 
the solar farm investment all over the country. Indeed, the installation capacity increased 
dramatically from 2009 (see Table 4.1 for detailed figures).  
Table 4.1  Photovoltaic production capacities and the share of domestic 
usage 
Year Production 
capacity (MW) 
Installed 
capacity (MW) 
Domestic usage 
ratio (%) 
1999 16 -- -- 
2000 19 3 16 
2001 23.5 4.5 19 
2002 42 8.5 20 
2003 52 10 19 
2004 62 10 16 
2005 70 8 11 
2006 80 10 13 
2007 100 20 20 
2008 140 40 29 
2009 300 160 53 
2010 800 500 63 
2011 3,300 2,500 76 
2012 8,300 5,000 60 
Source: Lu, Xu and Wang (2012). Ratio calculation by the author. 
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However, the NDRC and the Ministry of Finance soon found that some developers started 
cutting corners to reduce cost after they received subsidy from the government.4 Some 
investors were more eager to apply for the project and gain the subsidy than to construct the 
project, not to mention operate the solar farm. Two major reasons existed. First, there was 
no requirement in the project for the solar farm to be operational as a necessary condition for 
the release of subsidy. Second, some solar farm developers faced obstacles in connecting to 
the grid, demotivating them to be involved in work towards electricity sale.  
The central government adjusted the policy when the second part of the Golden Sun Project 
was announced in December 2012. With 2.83GW solar cells to be installed in the following 
two years, the amount of subsidy was closely tied to electricity sales: for each kilowatt the 
farm generated, the government would subsidise the project by 5.5 yuan RMB per watt if the 
project connected to the grid before 30 June 2013 (see Table 4.2).5 
It was estimated that at least 6GW solar installation capacity would be stimulated by the 
policy within four years (Interview EX1). However, problems with implementation persisted. 
In June 2013, the National Audit Office reported that about 0.26bn yuan RMB were lost in the 
project. The Ministry of Finance then announced the termination of the project, and the 
NDRC announced feed-in tariff as the main policy replacement for solar energy in the future.  
Table 4.2  Scheduled installation capacity for the second part of the 
Golden Sun Project (2012–2013) 
Company 
(owner) 
Project 
scale (MW) 
Location 
Yingli  268 Various locations 
Trina Solar 10 Jiangsu Province 
EGing Photovoltaic Tech. Co. Ltd 13.6 Jiangsu Province 
Jinko Solar 16 Shangrao Economic and 
Technical Development Zone 
LDK Solar Hi-TEch (HeFei) Co. Ltd 40 Ezhou, Hubei; Hunan 
Province 
Source: Author’s own based on information from www.MoST.gov.cn/tztg/201212/W020121211517128750955.pdf. 
4.2  Power and interests in the Golden Sun Project 
In order to analyse the implementation of the Golden Sun Project (Jin Tai Yang Gong Cheng 
in Chinese), we focus on a particular case – a photovoltaic electricity farm built by Yingli 
Solar in Dingzhou city in the Hebei Province. We selected the case for two reasons. First, 
Yingli is one of the industry leaders in China both for photovoltaic manufacturing and for 
technology deployment. It is representative of the ‘big players’ in the industry in terms of its 
interests and the policy influence channels. Second, Dingzhou is a county-level city located 
far away from any city that had experienced green city planning. Additionally, due to its size 
and location, it has no political influence on policies related to industrial development. It is 
simply an implementer of those policies. With its focus on local interests, Dingzhou is a good 
example of ‘weak local government’ that is quite different from the local governments with the 
strong ‘local entrepreneurship’ feature reported in existing literature.  
                                               
4 Source: National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China, 
www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/3296067.html (accessed 5 May 2015). 
5 If the farm connects to the grid later than 30 June 2013, the government would reduce the amount of subsidy to 5 yuan RMB 
per watt before 31 December 2013, and 4 yuan RMB per watt before 30 June 2014.  
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4.2.1  Stakeholder identification 
There were four major actors (or stakeholders) in the Golden Sun Project: national 
government (central government), local government, the solar manufacturer and the solar 
electricity farm developer. They were involved in the policy implementation process 
simultaneously with different goals, responsibilities and interests. 
National government 
The Chinese national or central government (Chinese: Zhong Yang Zheng Fu) was 
responsible for designing the Golden Sun Project. At the central level, the NDRC, MoST and 
MoF jointly designed the policy and the implementation process. The implementation was 
executed along the following steps: 
First, the solar farm developer prepared a feasibility study report on the project and 
submitted it to the local Development and Reform Committee (DRC), Bureau of Science and 
Technology and Bureau of Finance, together with the subsidy application form and the 
project implementation plan. In these documents, the farm developer provided basic 
information about the project to be reviewed by the various agencies in the local government.  
With supplementary application documents (such as an environmental impact assessment 
report), the solar farm developer then passed the application to the provincial DRC for project 
assessment. The provincial Bureau of Science and Technology and the Bureau of Finance 
then assessed the qualifications of the developer. Subsequently, the three governmental 
branches officially granted the developer permission to implement the project. When 
construction started, the MoF provided the matching financial subsidy to the developer. The 
audit started when the project was finalised.  
During this process, the central government retained the key authority of application approval 
and subsidy allocation.  
Local government (county-level government where the solar project locates) 
The layers of government below the provincial government assisted the central government 
by sharing the administrative workload, which included passing on the necessary documents 
and application forms to the higher levels of government and passing on the permission and 
financial subsidy to the developer. The local government seldom had any voice in 
policymaking or policy adjustment. But local government could influence the implementation 
procedure to a large extent. Local government that expects benefit from the local taxation on 
solar farm developers when they generated profits from electricity sales would actively 
promote the implementation by setting higher priority over the administrative process and 
speeding up the necessary document work, or by setting supplementary local policies to 
attract solar farm developers (e.g. extra tax deduction policy for solar farms). Demotivated 
local governments, however, can easily establish implementation obstacles by setting a 
lower priority for the policy or by passively processing the documents and extending the 
application procedure. 
Solar manufacture and farm developer 
Industrial experience from around the globe suggests that there is substantial specialisation 
in the solar energy industry. Solar farm developers are usually different from the PV cell 
manufacturers. Yet, in China, many solar farm developers were affiliated to manufacturers of 
PV. For example, in this particular case, the developer was also the solar cell manufacturer – 
Yingli Solar (Chinese: Ying Li Neng Yuan) was the solar electricity generation branch of 
Yingli Solar Electricity (Chinese: Ying Li Guang Fu Dian Li).  
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4.2.2 Analysis of stakeholder interests  
Central government mainly interested in climate mitigation and solar industry 
development rather than in energy security/generation 
The policy intent of the Golden Sun Project reflected the interests and concerns of the central 
government in developing the solar industry in China. As part of the Chinese climate 
strategy, renewable energy development, including PV technology, was a long-term 
development goal. Besides, the policy was especially designed in 2009 to protect the 
domestic PV industry from recession after the global financial crisis. ‘The major goal of the 
project was to promote domestic technology development and up-scale the PV industry for 
the first time’, solar expert Zhao Yuwen indicated in an interview, which clearly indicated the 
priorities of the central government (Interview EX1).  
The direct policy goal was to digest overcapacity by stimulating domestic deployment when 
the international solar cell demand slumped in 2008. Although China had bypassed Germany 
to be the largest PV manufacturer in the world, most of the products were still made for 
export. For example, the manufacturing capacity reached 4.1GW in 2009, yet the domestic 
installation only accounted for 300MW. Over 90 per cent of the production capacity was 
exported. The excessive reliance on the vagaries of the export market was combined with a 
push by the United States and the European Union to initiate an ‘anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy’ investigation procedure towards Chinese PV products starting from 2012. As a 
result, the policy imperative was also driven by the need to look inward and explore options 
domestically. By designating photovoltaics as one of the emerging industries, the central 
government embarked on the plan to use the domestic market as the means to stimulate the 
industry through the Golden Sun Project. Although the project contained off-grid energy 
generation as one of the targets, it clearly indicated it was ‘to demonstrate electricity 
solutions such as photovoltaic power station, solar/wind station, or hydro/solar station in 
remote areas or off-grid areas’. For example in 2012, out of a total number of 275 projects in 
remote areas, only 18 were off-grid while the other 257 projects were on-grid projects.6 This 
focus on on-grid projects clearly suggests that industry development and new technological 
solution rather than energy generation/security were the main goals of the central 
government.  
Manufacturers’ emphasis on improvement in competitiveness  
During the implementation of the Golden Sun Project, the cost of solar electricity was higher 
than the cost of coal electricity in China. During interviews, Yingli Solar, Suntech and other 
solar farm owners expressed the view that ‘the project might not gain huge profit without 
government subsidy’ (Interview F1). In other words, the real motivation to implement the 
Golden Sun Project was not based on short-term cost–benefit analysis.  
Indeed, solar farms were of extreme importance to Yingli Solar in terms of long-term strategic 
growth of the company. Developing a solar farm was a large project involving PV 
manufacturers, solar farm developers and the owner/operational firm of the farm, which 
required strong organisational capacity. 
On the one hand, the project was definitely good news for the manufacturing sector 
(of solar industry), because it clearly indicated that the government wanted to 
stimulate the domestic market. Also, the company [Yingli] took it as an opportunity to 
expand its business from pure manufacturing to systematic design and down-stream 
electricity station operation. 
(Interview F1) 
                                               
6 Source: Project list of the Golden Sun Project (in Chinese): http://wenku.baidu.com/view/9acca2d8d15abe23482f4d49.html 
(accessed 12 December 2014). 
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Yingli Solar, therefore, built the Dingzhou solar electricity farm to increase its long-term 
competitiveness using the opportunity provided by the subsidy support from the government.  
As the interviewees told us, Yingli was able to save on costs, achieve technological 
improvements and make profits through the process. 
Originally, Yingli took the Dingzhou project mainly as a demonstration project. The 
project was profitable, although not hugely so. The situation started to change in 2008 
with the global financial crisis. The material costs [the cost of silicon worldwide] 
decreased from US$500 per kilogram to US$20 per kilogram; at the same time, the 
exploration of the domestic market through concession projects pushed manufactures 
to further reduce the cost and increase the conversion efficiency of the modular. 
In response, Yingli Group (the mother company of Yingli Solar) set itself a target of 
developing the entire production chain of the solar electricity industry, including polysilicon 
production, solar panel production, solar system design and integration, solar farm 
development and solar farm operation since 2010. It is this production chain extension that 
ensured that the company was able to ‘enjoy lowest cost at each stage of the production and 
development and save overall cost dramatically’. After that, Yingli set up several branches in 
many provinces of China developing solar farms locally. Yingli’s participation in the project is 
indicative of their intention of increasing competitiveness by integrated development and 
operation of solar farms.  
Local government mainly concerned about taxation and job creation  
Under a top-down policymaking paradigm, it is assumed that local government would 
implement policies announced by the central government. However, existing literature 
suggests that the effort in policy implementation might be influenced by contextual variables 
(such as local public support), structural variables (such as clear and consistent objectives) 
and material variables (such as technical difficulties or the extent of behaviour change 
required) (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983). Local governments could therefore be motivated 
by their own concerns in policy implementation, even though central government clearly set 
up climate change mitigation as the main policy goal.  
When we interviewed the local DRC and Bureau of Finance in Dingzhou city government, the 
interviewee clearly indicated the gap between central government and local government as 
policymaker and policy implementer. On the one hand, implementing the central policy was 
quite important to the local government, especially in terms of their administrative duty of 
implementation compliance. The representative from the Dingzhou Bureau of Finance 
declared that it exactly followed the central direction of how to allocate the fund without local 
discretion: ‘Local government had no right to design the subsidy policy. All policy directives 
came from the central government, while local government simply implemented these 
policies’ (Interviewee LG2). Interviewees also expressed that they had little control over the 
project application and operation since this policy was top-down. Interviewee LG1 mentioned: 
Both the project application and the subsidy in a project like this [Golden Sun Project] 
can be managed between the provincial government and the firm. In that sense, we 
(local DRC or Bureau of Finance) might have no knowledge about the existence of 
the project.  
For example, the local government might not be fully aware of the central financial subsidy 
unless it is clearly notified by the upper authority. In this case, Dingzhou Bureau of Finance 
realised that the solar farm subsidies existed only when Yingli asked them if they had 
received the subsidy transfer.  
Meanwhile, the interest gap between the local government and the firm was large. The 
greatest concern local government had was related to local income taxation. ‘What we were 
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mainly concerned with was the extent to which this project might bring local government 
taxation. For example, job generation and tax income increase were all welcome.’ ‘We 
eagerly wanted to know what Golden Sun Project might bring to the local city [from you]’ 
(from Interviewee LG2). Yet the local government could barely see any tax benefits because 
of the central tax policies for the renewable energy industry. The so-called ‘exemption for two 
years and half rate redeem for three years’ (liang mian san jian ban) indicated that starting 
from the profit-making year, renewable energy enterprises would be exempt from income tax 
for the first two years and enjoy a half-rate reduction for the subsequent three years. In this 
sense, the local government would lose tax income for each Golden Sun Project for at least 
two years.  
We have drawn up a stakeholder interests table (Table 4.3). It is worth noting that the Golden 
Sun Project did not involve the general public in the policymaking and implementation 
procedure, so no civil society interests are presented. 
Table 4.3  Key interests of stakeholders in the Golden Sun Project 
Stakeholder 
Climate 
change 
Local 
taxation 
Jobs Competitiveness Profit 
Central 
government 
✔   ✔  
Local (city) 
government 
 ✔ ✔   
Firms    ✔ ✔ 
4.2.3  Stakeholders’ attitudes towards implementation  
With different interests, stakeholders in the Golden Sun Project show different attitudes 
towards policy implementation. One stakeholder may have different attitudes towards 
different policy goals (see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1  Stakeholders’ attitudes and different priorities 
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Table 4.4  Measurement of attitudes towards implementation  
Attitudes Themes appearing in interview 
Passive ‘We don’t care’ 
‘It is not important’ 
‘We could do nothing about it’ 
‘We are short of budget’ 
Active ‘This is extremely important’ 
‘We will fully obey this’ 
‘We will consider firms’ suggestions’ 
‘We will try to contact the provincial government or the central government’ 
 
As defined in Table 4.4, we describe the implementation attitudes of the different 
stakeholders. In interviews, we found a positive attitude of the central government in the 
implementation process. Namely, the project had two goals: to contribute to climate 
mitigation and to improve the industry’s competitiveness in solar industry. The central 
government pushed the policy from the beginning. This was confirmed both by local 
governments and by firms in our interviews. The central government mainly adopted two 
policy instruments: administrative regulation, and financial support to qualified projects. 
According to the central government, administrative regulations would smoothen the process 
by making local agencies responsible (local Bureau of Science and Technology, local Bureau 
of Finance and local Development and Reform Commission); and financial support would 
provide enough motivation for firms to build PV projects to meet the industrial development 
goals and experiment with innovative ideas to implement the project. 
Local governments (particularly city government) we interviewed in Dingzhou had passive 
attitudes towards the project. They were enthusiastic about local firm profit, local job creation 
and local taxation, but policy instruments selected by the central government did not align 
with their preferences. With solar farms enjoying income tax deductions, local government 
could get hardly any taxation from the solar farm in the first three years. In addition, the solar 
farm was not a labour-intensive project, thereby having limited job creation prospects. 
Therefore, with little interest in climate mitigation and improving firm competitiveness, local 
governments had little interest in the Golden Sun Project other than being passive allies in 
discharging their administrative duties.  
Outside government, firms or business sectors were very active in promoting the Golden Sun 
Project. In the interview, Yingli explained the project application process as following. First, 
the firm ascertained whether the local government (Dingzhou government) had any local 
policies promoting solar farm development and operation. Having found that no such policies 
existed, they also noticed that the local government had little knowledge about the Golden 
Sun Project, including the application process and financial support channels. Therefore, 
Yingli Guo Xiang Solar Farm did not apply for the project through Dingzhou government, 
where the farm was to be located. Rather, it applied through Baoding city (the city that is one 
level higher than Dingzhou city) where the parent company was located. The interviewee 
from Yingli said: 
We applied for the project through Baoding city… because the Yingli Group had been 
there for nearly 10 years and had built very good relationship with the government, 
which (we supposed) would smoothen the application process and speed it up. 
 In this case, Yingli was more active than the local government. 
We also asked if the company used any of its connections with experts in Beijing to influence 
the policymaking process. The interviewees could not recall any evidence, but they indicated 
‘there might be indirect influence since Yingli has been the leading firm in the industry for 
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years and is getting to know a majority of the experts. The company’s opinion will surely be 
directly or indirectly passed to the policymakers’. Leading firms such as Yingli built good 
relationships with ministries in Beijing (such as the Ministry of Science and Technology 
through R&D project), which positioned them strongly as compared to many city 
governments. 
4.2.4  Mismatching interests and implementation barriers  
To understand stakeholders’ attitudes to the project, it is important to check stakeholders’ 
interests. However, it is also important to ascertain whether different interests are matched to 
each other in the implementation process. The hypothesis is that if different interests are not 
aligned to each other, the implementation process might encounter difficulties. Figure 4.2 
presents the analytical results including both policy goals (presented in circles) as well as 
actions taken to fulfil those goals (presented in rectangles) of different stakeholders in the 
implementation of the Golden Sun Project.  
It is worth noting that implementation could be smooth when some of the stakeholder’s 
interests aligned with each other. For example, the central government provided financial 
subsidy to the industry hoping this could stimulate the development of the industry, which 
was perfectly aligned to the firms’ goal of increasing profit and gaining support to increase 
the competitiveness of the project. Therefore, firms were very active in pushing the 
implementation of the project. They even pushed the local government for the administrative 
procedure. The administrative interests of central and local government aligned with each 
other as well. Local government, when involved into the project application process, was 
responsible for all document process within deadlines. 
Mismatching interests: unaligned interest  
Some of the policy goals did not lead to an alignment of interests of the stakeholders and 
could, instead, lead to conflicts during the implementation process. For example, the central 
government aimed at expanding the solar energy market as a direct result of the project, an 
interest aligned with the firms’ interests but not of the local governments. The local 
governments’ interest in solar market enlargement would be primarily driven by the ability of 
such enlargement to deliver higher taxes or create more jobs. In other words, unless the 
project led to job creation or taxation increase, the pure enlargement of a certain industry 
would hardly be in line with the local governments’ interests. This is why Dingzhou city 
government lacked motivation in promoting the solar farm in their jurisdiction. 
Mismatching interests: insufficient policy tools 
At the same time, there were certain issues that were of interest to only one stakeholder. For 
example, encouraging technological improvement in the PV industry was an interest of the 
central government. Yet, the financial subsidy allocation did not have any prerequisites for 
technological improvement. In other words, no detailed policy instruments were designed for 
the accomplishment of this policy goal. Therefore, the local government, which had no 
interest in improving the technological level in the industry, was not motivated to respond to 
this central preference. The passive attitude and mismatching of interests of the two left the 
project with ‘no real improvement in a technological sense’ (Interview EX1).  
It is worth noting that the Golden Sun Project, although clearly designed as a public project, 
was not designed in detail with specific targets. It encouraged local firms to invest in solar 
farm construction, yet with no quota assigned to each local government. This gave plenty of 
room to the local governments to implement it selectively. When local government chose not 
to fully push the policy forward, the implementation process did not stop, since other 
stakeholders pushed it forward based on their interests and the matching of interests among 
them. 
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Mismatching interests: different interpretation of policy contents 
When central government targeted domestic market exploration, it adopted installation 
capacity as the measurement. ‘[These targets] were easier to set and easier to get 
information about’, said Zhao Yuwen. Therefore, ‘central government didn’t regulate the solar 
farms to connect to the grid and sell electricity’. This interpretation of market expansion led to 
perverse actions. Some solar farm developers cheated on the project to get national subsidy 
but postponed or cancelled the solar farm construction. Low-quality construction also 
happened. However, this also implied that firms that were interested in operating solar farms 
and gaining long-term electricity sales profit were prevented from aligning interests with the 
central government due to the lacunae in policy design. 
Figure 4.2  Relationship of interests in the Golden Sun Project  
 
4.3  Conclusion of Case I: photovoltaics  
4.3.1  Implementation gap between central policy design and local 
implementation 
The PV case confirms the gap between national policy formulation and local policy 
implementation in China. Existing literature on Chinese policy implementation has already 
revealed this gap in different policy areas, including climate-related policies. While central 
government shifted its policy priority from being pure GDP-driven to having multiple goals 
(e.g. environmental protection, climate mitigation, energy security), it designed national-level 
policy through strategic balancing between different policy goals. At the implementation level, 
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however, local governments were still concerned about local economic development and 
preferred short-term and relatively simple policy goals. Our research provides a detailed 
insight into this tension at the local and central level driven by the divergent interests.  
The tension was clearly present in the PV case, in which the central government considered 
solar energy development as a national strategy in response to climate change and energy 
security, while local government considered solar energy development more as an 
opportunity to increase local taxation or create jobs. Local government in Dingzhou clearly 
lost its motivation in implementing the Golden Sun Project when it found no significant 
economic benefits due to its implementation.  
4.3.2  Passive local governments and active firms in policy implementation 
The existing literature does not find cases where there is passive implementation at the local 
level. The implementation of the Golden Sun Project in Dingzhou city suggests that the lack 
of alignment of interests between the local government and local firms can generate 
substantial risks and uncertainties. 
When the local government’s interests do not align with those of the local firms, as in the 
case of the Golden Sun Project, there is hardly any motivation for the local government to 
promote industrial development. Primarily focused on local development, the local 
governments passively responded to the central policy. It was the leading firm that filled in 
the motivation gap and pushed local government to transfer benefit down at the business 
level. It also clearly showed that local government could be bypassed when it was only 
responsible for the administrative aspects of the policy implementation process.  
The judgment of whether an industry is potentially profitable or not depends on the local 
government’s perception of the industry and might be influenced by many factors. One 
important factor is the matching of interests between local governments and firms. While the 
solar case suggests that the lack of such alignment led to a passive role of the local 
government, we now turn to the case of wind energy, which shows how alignment of 
interests between the firms and local governments leads to the development of collaborative 
relationships. Such collaborative relationships raise the motivation of the local government to 
promote industrial development. 
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5  Case II: Chinese wind energy technology 
5.1  Background information on the Jiuquan 10GW Wind Farm 
Project 
Located in the north-west of China, Gansu Province has rich wind resources. Jiuquan city is 
located in the western part of Gansu Province. Jiuquan has a land area of 19.2km2, with 
potential wind resource of 210GW and available storage of 82GW. It is geographically and 
climatologically appropriate for large-scale, concentrated wind farm construction.  
Jiuquan Wind Base was the first of seven state-planned wind bases over 10GW under 
construction. In May 2008, the NDRC approved the construction of Jiuquan Base in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan. In stage I, four wind farms with 3.8GW installed capacity were constructed in 
Changma, North Bridge, Ganhekou and Qiaowan. In 2009, another 16 wind farms of the 
stage I project started construction. By the end of 2011, 3,600MW capacity had been 
installed and connected to grid with 200MW still under construction. With the smooth 
advance of Jiuquan stage I programmes, the NDRC informed relevant participants to begin 
planning Jiuquan stage II, with 5GW capacity. In May 2011, preparatory work for Jiuquan II 
had been approved by the National Energy Bureau. By the end of February 2013, the 
programme passed the technology-related tests and was about to begin operation.  
In each stage, multiple wind farms were constructed. In each wind farm, multiple developers 
purchased wind turbines from different manufacturers in different stages. There were three 
main wind farms at stage I owned by State Development and Investment Corporation 
(SDIC), China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) and HydroChina. Construction of 
HydroChina Wind Farm began in 2009, installing 67 Goldwind 1.5MW turbines and             
67 Sinovel 1.5MW turbines. The project was connected to the grid at the end of 2009 and 
had generated 4.87 million kWh by the middle of 2012.  
According to interviews with local government officials in Jiuquan, the wind industry became 
a major contributor to economic development. In 2010, the wind farm in Jiuquan generated 
11.868 million kWh electricity with 5.5bn yuan RMB sales; 8.4 per cent of the GDP increase 
came from wind-related sectors (Interview LG2). Local firms in Jiuquan were involved in wind 
farm construction for more than five years and built good relationships with local government. 
These made wind sector development and policy implementation in this case quite different 
from solar policy implementation.  
5.2  Power and interests in the Jiuquan 10GW Wind Farm 
Project 
This report selected the implementation process of Jiuquan 10GW Wind Base in Gansu 
Province as a case study. This was the largest wind farm base built in China in 2009. 
Important manufacturers as well as wind farm developers in the Chinese wind energy 
industry were all involved in this project making this a good representative case.  
5.2.1  Stakeholder identification  
There were five major stakeholders in the Jiuquan Wind Base Project: national government, 
local government, domestic wind equipment manufacturers, foreign wind equipment 
manufacturers and the grid. They were all involved in the policymaking and implementation 
process simultaneously with different interests and behaviours. 
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National government 
Policy support for wind energy in China was top-down. Like solar energy, wind energy was 
regarded as one of the promising renewable energy options to be explored in response to 
climate change. Listing wind in the Renewable Energy Law of 2006, the Chinese government 
promoted its development in line with its climate mitigation goal. And also like solar 
development in China, the wind sector did not benefit from government policy until the 
industry grew to a certain scale by itself and encountered developmental difficulties. Without 
a systematic climate policy framework to guide wind sector development, Chinese central 
government promoted the sector through industrial policies due to the large economic scale 
and strategic importance wind sector had to national economic development.  
From 2003, central government, including the NDRC, MoST, MoF and MIIT, worked to 
stimulate the wind energy industry (Interview NDRC, 2012). Through six rounds of 
concession projects, China overtook the United States as the country with the largest 
cumulated wind turbine installation capacity.  
However, the central government (especially the NDRC) slowed down its support to local 
wind farm construction after 2009 when many off-grid electricity abandonment accidents 
happened in different areas. Grid connection became more essential than wind turbine 
manufacture and wind farm development. As a result, the NDRC slowed down the 
administrative procedure for new wind farm construction. In 2012, the NDRC launched a new 
policy and made 80 per cent of wind electricity usage the necessary condition for further wind 
farm construction approval.  
Local government (provincial government and city government) 
In 2013, the GDP of Gansu Province was 626.8bn yuan RMB and it was ranked 27th out of 
the 31 provinces under the jurisdiction of the central government.7 However, in terms of size, 
with an area of 453,700km2, it was ranked seventh in the country. Not suitable for agriculture 
development and falling behind in industrial development, Gansu Province was in great need 
of finding its development pathway through policy interventions. At the provincial level, 
encouraging local economic development and improving local technology were core goals of 
these policy interventions. For example, the policy documents described the 10GW Wind 
Farm Base as the ‘Three Gorges on the Land’ (i.e. comparable to the massive hydropower 
project) to emphasise the importance this project might have for China. After the Chairman of 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, inspected Jiuquan and 
encouraged the wind farm project, provincial leaders inspected the construction site quite 
often (Interview LG3). The provincial government also provided R&D support to local wind 
turbine firms, though not so huge in the absolute amount.  
Jiuquan is located in the Hexi corridor and at the centre of the 10GW Wind Farm Base of 
Gansu Province. All wind farms are built around it geographically. The Jiuquan government 
is responsible for all the administrative duties of wind farm construction and operation. The 
Jiuquan government is the public service provider to firms, supporting new technology 
development and commercialisation. It built the Jiuquan Wind Electricity Park,8 facilitating the 
provision of tax breaks and other financially beneficial policies coming from the central and 
the provincial government including R&D support. For example, Jiuquan government has an 
annual budget of 5m yuan RMB for technological research on grid connection and for 
conducting R&D on new types of wind turbine. 
                                               
7 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Data: http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=fsnd 
(accessed 6 May 2015). 
8 10GW Wind Farm Base is the overall project name constructed in two stages. For each stage, several wind farms are 
constructed at different places in Gansu with several wind turbines installed in each wind farm. Jiuquan Wind Electricity Park is 
the manufacturing base that produces wind equipment to be installed in wind farms; it was upgraded as a national economic 
and technological development zone in 2013. 
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Local firms 
Before 2008, Lanzhou Electric Corporation (LEC) was the major wind turbine firm in Gansu. 
LEC entered the wind turbine business in 2006. It had torque converter drive technology 
licensed from German firm Voith, localised the technology with brushless synchronous 
technology in 2007 and produced a prototype of a 1MW wind turbine. The improvement was 
specially designed for the harsh weather conditions in Gansu.  
Nationwide, LEC did not rank in the top ten wind turbine manufacturers. Yet it received a lot 
of help from Gansu Province. For example, LEC received R&D funding jointly from the 
central government (800,000 yuan RMB) and the provincial government (4m yuan RMB). 
‘We [Gansu Province] are also limited in R&D budget. We could only help a little with the 
firm’s R&D cost’ (Interview LG6). LEC is still short of R&D funding and has fallen behind in 
market competition.  
Other domestic firms (leading firms) and foreign firms 
After Jiuquan Wind Electricity Park was built, more wind turbine manufacturers rushed in to 
take advantage of the economic opportunities. As of now, all the major domestic wind turbine 
manufacturers and assembly plants have local plants in Jiuquan, including Goldwind, 
Sinovel, United Power and Hui Teng.  
There are no foreign wind turbine manufacturers located in Jiuquan Wind Farm. But foreign 
wind turbines are competitive in life-cycle efficiency and wind turbines from Vestas and 
Gamesa with 1.5MW and 2MW have taken a major share in Jiuquan. Since the NDRC 
eliminated the requirement for localisation of wind turbine manuafacture in 2009, foreign 
companies can compete with domestic firms on the spot.  
5.2.2  Analysis of stakeholder interests 
Central government tried to promote the growth of wind energy industry 
As shown in Table 5.1, the central government realised that wind energy development is 
essential for climate mitigation. By increasing the proportion of renewable energy (i.e. wind 
and solar) and nuclear energy in the total energy consumption, China would be able to rely 
less on low-quality coal. The development of the renewable energy industry was, therefore, 
strategically important for China. However, this goal was only mentioned as a broad policy 
intent in the Jiuquan wind project proposal. No detailed measurements or policy instruments 
were outlined to fulfil this particular goal. Energy security was also unrelated to wind energy 
development since the major emphasis was on oil (Interview EX2).  
The central government clearly indicated its interest in stimulating the wind energy industry 
through an approval from the NDRC for the planning of wind farms. The approved plans 
indicated that the wind farm would generate 8.48 billion kWh each year after the wind base 
construction, which would save 2.97 million tons of coal and reduce GHG emission by     
8.299 million tons.  
Unlike the solar project, the 10GW Wind Farm Base did not enjoy extra subsidy or financial 
policy besides the feed-in tariff (FIT) policy and support through the CDM. NDRC believed 
wind energy was more competitive than solar energy. With the FIT, most of the wind farms 
were profitable and the enlarged market could further increase the profit (Interview EX2).  
The targets for technological improvement were partly fulfilled by the detailed planning of the 
NDRC. It was believed that by enlarging the market size, technological innovations would 
also be incentivised. To promote technological development in the wind sector, China 
followed the European Union model, which obtained intellectual property rights for core 
technologies, rather than the Indian model, which licensed key technologies from other 
countries.  
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As mentioned above, a short-term economic effect soon appeared in Jiuquan from the wind 
manufacture sector. But grid connection appeared to be the main obstacle for the long-term 
development of wind in the area. Small turbulence in the grid (caused either by a turbine 
failure or grid instability) might cause a large number of wind turbines to go offline leading to 
grid downtime and wind electricity abandonment (the grid will not accept wind electricity due 
to the instability). Jiuquan experienced accidents from such offline incidents in 2009 and bore 
a huge amount of electricity abandonment. Three reasons contributed to abandonment. First, 
when a large number of wind turbines connected to the grid, their capacity to operate through 
periods of lower grid voltage became essential. Turbines without capacity for low voltage ride 
through (LVRT) can create a chain effect in the grid and take other generators offline. 
Second, Jiuquan is located far from end users in the south-east costal area. Although local 
government planned to sell all wind electricity generated to the grid, electricity supply was 
greater than demand due to the limited local demand and limited capacity of long-distance 
electricity transmission. Third, the Chinese grid followed a central planning control model in 
which the grid manager distributed contributions between all electricity resources. Since 
renewable energies, such as wind and solar, need supplementary energy (e.g. coal-fire 
power) to reduce their instability, they are regarded as less competitive by the grid manager 
and are given less opportunity to contribute, especially when supplementary energy sources 
are scarce for heating in the winter.  
The large scale of wind electricity curtailment alerted the central government about product 
quality and operational standards. Policy interests at central level had switched from wind 
installation capacity to the strengthening of deployment efforts. The NDRC introduced new 
standards for LVRT in 2011 and urged all the wind farms to meet the standards before they 
could connect to the grid again. When we visited the Yumen wind farm (one of the early wind 
farms built in the wind base) in summer 2012, it was in the process of upgrading wind 
turbines to meet the new standards. The average output accounts for only 6–20 per cent of 
designed capacity.  
Both the NDRC and some leading firms took this as ‘normal industry reshuffle’. ‘This [strict 
standards] is a must-do action for further development of wind energy industry, and this is 
what market should do’ (Interview EX1).  
Table 5.1  Main stakeholders’ interests in the 10GW Wind Farm Base 
Project 
    Interests 
 
Stake- 
holders 
Climate 
/energy 
Local 
development 
Technology Industry development 
Local 
taxation 
Jobs Core 
technology 
Market 
share 
Profit Competitiveness 
Central 
government 
✔   ✔   ✔ 
Provincial 
government 
   ✔  ✔  
Local 
government 
 ✔ ✔   ✔  
Local firms    ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Domestic 
firms 
    ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Foreign 
firms 
    ✔ ✔ ✔ 
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Provincial government promoted local R&D and made wind energy a strategic industry 
Gansu provincial government was not directly involved in wind energy development. On the 
one hand, it had less legislative power over national strategic policymaking and was 
therefore more of an implementer than a policymaker. On the other hand, in this case it had 
very limited financial power (given its location in the north-west of the country with low per 
capita GDP) to promote local development through financial support. In addition, the weak 
connections with local firms made the provincial government reliant on city government for 
project management. However, the provincial government was highly motivated to implement 
central policy. It aimed at differentiating its development path from other provinces by 
becoming known for its support for wind power. To pursue this goal, it made its efforts on 
three tasks: supported local R&D activities, offered partial support for local FIT, and helped 
local government in lobbying the central government.  
From the R&D perspective, the provincial government first chose LEC and supported its 
technology as potential mainstream technology. Second, the provincial government had the 
capacity and willingness to support wind resource prediction research. The provincial 
government also set up R&D projects.  
For local FIT, according to NDRC (2009a), the provincial government would cover the price 
gap between the local desulfurised coal electricity price and the bidding price of the project. 
This requirement gave provincial government an important role in the wind farm project. The 
incentives for the firm would have been greatly raised if the provincial subsidy reached the 
business in time with the full amount. It might have also demotivated the business sector if it 
went in the opposite direction.  
The lobbying position at provincial level is stronger than at local level. Unlike emission 
reduction goals or economic growth targets that were written into the local cadre’s annual 
evaluation, the renewable energy development target was optional. In other words, both 
provincial government and city government had a choice of whether to implement it or not. 
Considering the large share that the wind industry contributed to Gansu, the provincial 
government was highly motivated to promote its further development. It not only includes 
wind development in its 11th Five-Year Plan, but also helps local government to lobby the 
central government for additional beneficial policies. For example, the provincial government 
collaborated with experts at the Chinese Academy of Engineering in a research project to 
study how to transfer wind electricity generated in Gansu to end users in a more efficient and 
effective way. The ultimate goal for the project was to build an ultra-high voltage transmission 
line in Gansu (Interview EX5).  
Local government was interested in local industrial development, job creation and 
taxation 
Local government emphasised three things in its policy documents as well as in the 
interviews: local government taxation, local job creation and local consumption, and the 
spillover effects the wind industry might have on other industries. 
During the interview, local government always started by describing the wind energy industry 
as a strategic emerging industry nationally and locally, yet they made detailed policy 
recommendations to the central government asking for higher FIT, more R&D funding, less 
tax deduction (which meant more local taxation gain) and beneficial national planning on grid 
upgrading. And at the core of all these recommendations, it is the local development goal 
that mattered the most. 
In local planning documents, Jiuquan city called its strategy ‘resource for equipment’, which 
aimed at building an industrial park for wind equipment manufacture and required firms that 
wanted the wind farm concession to build local manufacturing plants. According to the city, it 
built wind manufacturing plants in a 6km2 zone and solar equipment manufacture plants in a 
zone of 4km2. The target was to attract more than 35 major wind equipment firms with local 
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investment of 8.35bn yuan RMB. The production value reached 20bn yuan RMB in 2010 
(Interview LG2). But local benefit from wind electricity sale was neither stable nor of a large 
amount. According to the National Bureau of Energy, the 2014 national average of wind 
power utilisation hours was 1,905 hours, 120 hours down from the 2013 average. And in 
Gansu, 0.7 billion kWh wind electricity was abandoned, which further reduced wind farm 
profit and local taxation.  
Firms (local, domestic and foreign) intended to increase competitiveness 
Local firms entered the industry late and had less market competitiveness. Their strategy 
was to obtain core technology that might bring long-term potential for future competitiveness 
and future market (Interview F5). 
Leading domestic firms took Jiuquan as a good project to extend their market share in China. 
Relying on their licensed technology and their strong R&D capacity, implementation of wind 
farms in Jiuquan was not technologically challenging for these firms. It was the market 
exploration and technological demonstration that made the project very attractive to them 
(Interview F2, F3).  
Foreign firms clearly understood the Chinese government’s policy goal to change energy 
structure in response to climate change. In interviews with Vestas China, the director of 
public relations said that the company had great faith in the development of the Chinese wind 
market due to the clear governmental goal. The company was even willing to accept short-
term loss in exchange for long-term profit in China. Foreign companies, such as Vestas, had 
clear strategic goals in China: to increase the market share and to educate Chinese users for 
life-time cost–benefit analysis which would make foreign turbines more competitive. In the 
Jiuquan case, foreign companies did not have a large share in the concession until 2009 
when more strict national standards were under discussion (Interview F6).  
5.2.3  Stakeholders’ attitudes towards policy implementation 
Owing to different interests in wind farm policy goals, stakeholders showed different attitudes 
towards the policy implementation (see Figure 5.1).  
Central government had the strongest power to push the policy 
Central government (especially NDRC and MoST) was leading the wind policymaking 
process. Local government, firms and experts kept lobbying for new policies according to 
their own interests, but it was still the central government that made the final decision for 
others to implement.  
For the Chinese wind energy industry, the central government guaranteed policy 
implementation mainly through administrative authority. But this top-down political structure 
led to an implementation gap between central policy requirements and local reality. For 
example, local government sought tax increase and job opportunity generation, which could 
not be fulfilled by the policy goal at all. The conflict normally converged at the provincial 
government level and passed onto central government for collaborative solutions in a policy 
adjustment process.  
Local government and firms sought real benefits in policy implementation  
As in the solar PV case, local government could not fulfil its interests in the concurrent wind 
farm policy because ‘local government had no right to make policy, especially taxation policy, 
which was essential to local benefit’ (Jiuquan Bureau of Taxation). Yet local government did 
not behave passively in the wind case. They were very active in lobbying the central 
government because of the huge economic potential wind energy brought. To get short-term 
benefit, they urged wind energy companies to build manufacturing facilities locally to gain 
income tax and value added tax. For long-term benefits, they kept pushing the central policy 
adjustment towards wind electricity sales and/or developing new industry for local electricity 
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consumption (e.g. chemical engineering business). Jointly with the local industry sector, the 
Jiuquan government used all its efforts in lobbying for better FIT and local industry 
rearrangement. In addition, starting from 2011, Jiuquan organised research projects that 
advanced turbine development and policy recommendations. Local government invited 
provincial leaders for site visits and built demonstration wind farms to meet new national 
standards. Through all these efforts, Jiuquan successfully persuaded the central government 
for better FIT in 2013.  
Provincial government had the least influence in the process 
Provincial government was also active in the wind farm base policy process. However the 
support provided was largely symbolic. In our interviews, provincial DRCs as well as 
provincial leaders emphasised the economic influence of the wind farm base to Gansu. But 
they emphasised more the symbolic meaning that wind farms brought to the province. In 
2006, the party secretary of Gansu proposed the project of ‘Construction of the wind corridor 
in the west, build “Three Gorges” on western land’. He clearly named wind development as 
part of the ‘western development’ strategy of the central government. Therefore, wind 
development could ‘upgrade traditional heavy industry in the province’, ‘could increase local 
income’, and could ‘protect the local environment as well as the ecological system’, and ‘we 
gradually changed the outdated heavy industry into wind manufacturing’ (Interview PG1). 
The provincial government described its policy goal as coordinating relevant stakeholders in 
three ways: first, it collaborated with local government for local wind electricity consumption 
planning so that the electricity could be efficiently used even if it could not be fully accepted 
by the grid; second, the provincial government collaborated with the land resource 
department, electricity department and meteorology department to improve wind resource 
prediction; third, one of the provincial government’s key roles was to help local governments 
to lobby the central government. Yet neither the provincial government nor local government 
had hardly any voice to coordinate the national grid.  
Figure 5.1  Stakeholders’ attitudes towards wind policy goals 
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5.2.4  Mismatching interests and implementation barriers  
As in the solar case, in Figure 5.2, there are several broken-line arrows presenting mismatch 
between the different stakeholders. Some of the mismatches arise due to different 
understanding of the policy goals, while others arise due to differences in their interests. We 
will focus on three major mismatches in the discussion section. 
Central and local governments had different preferences for R&D activities  
From 2006, China developed a national innovation system (NIS) to gradually replace its sole 
national support system and to stimulate private R&D capacities. In this new system, the 
national, provincial and local governments shared the R&D burden in many ways. For Gansu 
Province where local firms had weak R&D capacities, it was the national government that 
provided the largest share of R&D funding. Neither provincial government nor local 
government had enough capacity or willingness to support local R&D because of the limited 
taxation income.  
In the Jiuquan case, the torque converter brushless synchronous generator was a 
technology originally selected by the local firm LEC. Owing to its limited market share, the 
technology was not regarded as one of the major wind technologies in China. Rather, only 
large-scale (over 5MW) double-fed and permanent-magnet generators were regarded as 
innovative technology and supported by most. Although local government and provincial 
government kept lobbying to fund this technology, the results were not encouraging.  
Different interpretations of market exploration and profit-gaining goals 
The policy goal of the 10GW Wind Farm Base was to explore the domestic wind energy 
market. But central government and local government had different interpretations of ‘market 
exploration’, which led to barriers in implementation.  
The original central policy encouraged the building up of wind farms by setting an installation 
capacity target. Yet, this was not a necessary condition for wind energy market exploration, 
which should generate real demand from the end user. In the case of wind energy, the end 
use was the grid that purchased wind energy from wind farms. In the policy document setting 
up the 10GW Jiuquan Wind Farm Base, the NDRC clearly described the number of wind 
farms, scale of wind farm capacity and FIT (NDRC 2009b). Therefore, from an administrative 
point of view, provincial government and local government implemented the policy fully when 
the wind farm finished its construction. But what the local government really meant about 
market exploration related to the extent to which the local wind farm could sell its wind 
electricity to the grid (Interviews LG3, LG4, LG5). As a result, there was a mismatch between 
the understanding and interests of the local government and the central government. 
Policy documents also stipulated that the national grid would buy the electricity generated by 
renewable energy. The Renewable Energy Law (2006) indicated in Article 14 that: 
The relevant electricity grid enterprise shall, through entering a grid synchronisation 
agreement with the enterprise that has obtained an administrative licence for or report 
for archival purposes on electricity generation by using renewable energy, purchase 
the full amount of the synchronised electricity, as covered by its grid, of the project of 
synchronised electricity generation by using renewable energy, and provide 
synchronisation service for electricity generation by using renewable energy.  
The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) was the central government unit in 
charge of monitoring the electricity market in terms of making standards, ensuring 
competition and price checking.9 SERC had hierarchical branches down to county level to 
monitor the electricity market operation. But ‘there were not enough staff for monitoring 
                                               
9 SERC was merged into the NDRC (under the National Energy Administration) in 2013. Thus, the separation of pricing 
authority and monitoring authority ended. Yet, the case presented in the report still has a background of split authority. 
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purpose. SERC had to rely on bottom-up report and appeal to disclose market failure in the 
industry’ (Interview F6). This made the monitoring function of SERC useless, especially at 
the low level of government. The grid had stronger control over electricity purchase in spite of 
the national law enforcing renewable energy electricity sales. 
In 2007, SERC published Regulatory Approach on Grid Enterprises Purchase Renewable 
Energy Electricity in coordinating the Renewable Energy Law, which declared that ‘unless 
the renewable energy electricity causes force majeure or threatens the security and stability 
of the grid, grid enterprises shall not restrict renewable energy efforts’ (SERC 2007). Yet, the 
regulation also declared ‘SERC has the ultimate authority to interpret the situations for force 
majeure and grid threatening’. According to expert (F6):  
The key element preventing the grid to accept more wind energy was not technology 
but benefit distribution… The grid had very little motivation accepting wind energy for 
now. This could explain why the grid keep asking for higher standard for wind energy. 
The obstacles to the sales from the wind farms to the grid due to their different interests 
became the major reason preventing wind energy polices from being implemented properly 
and effectively. The further policy amendments had to add wind energy sales and 
consumption targets to align the interests of the various stakeholders. 
Some local government interests were not represented 
From an implementation perspective, the local implementer’s commitment as well as its 
leadership in the implementation is essential to the success of a policy (Mazmanian and 
Sabatier 1983). The whole set of wind energy promotional policies at the central level were 
aimed at increasing the scale (e.g. of installed capacity) of the industry rather than increasing 
local profit. Existing research suggests that only when local governments can ensure that 
financial benefits remain within their jurisdiction, would they have consistent and strong 
motivation towards the implementation of central government policies (Jin, Qian and 
Weingast 2005; Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995; Qian and Weingast 1997). Ignoring 
local interests led to several implementation obstacles. 
First of all, local government preferred to have local manufacturing rather than local wind 
farms. ‘Wind farms would not generate many job opportunities for the city, neither would it 
contribute to local taxation’ (Bureau of Jiuquan Taxation). According to the DRC in Jiuquan, 
the wind farm would generate at most two or three job opportunities for every 10kW. 
Normally, for a wind farm of 200kW, only 30–40 workers were needed for daily maintenance. 
Compared to its attitude to other labour-intensive industries, such as chemical engineering, 
local government was not interested in promoting the wind energy industry. The local 
government in Jiuquan once urged wind manufactures to build local plants as one of the 
bidding qualifications. Although central government halted the policy very quickly, this trend 
of local protection had a rational background in trying to narrow the interest gap.  
Second, local income (e.g. local taxation) did not increase along with the wind farm 
construction and operation. Rather, it decreased under the central schemes benefiting the 
wind sectors. Currently, the Jiuquan government is implementing three major financial 
policies, including value added tax (VAT) deduction for fixed assets in wind farms,               
50 per cent of income tax deduction, and an income tax exemption and reduction policy. 
None of these policies consider the local benefit forgone through loss of tax revenue. The 
key reason for this was that ‘local government had no influence in policy making’. Therefore, 
local government will not get any tax revenues from wind farms for five years.  
However, policy process was not a linear process that ended at the implementation stage. 
Local government never stopped lobbying the central government for further policy 
adjustment towards their benefit. The Jiuquan government kept letting the central 
government know about its difficulties in policy implementation and it did have support. 
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Figure 5.2 Relationship of interests in the 10GW Wind Farm Base Project 
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5.3  Conclusion of Case II: wind energy technology 
5.3.1  Policy formation at central level and policy implementation at local 
level 
Like the solar PV case, the wind policy case also demonstrates a clear gap between central 
policy design and local implementation. The Chinese central government framed clear goals 
for wind energy development. Deployment, rather than wind equipment manufacture, was at 
the core of central policy design. However, wind turbine manufacturing and wind farm 
construction and operation had different benefits for the local government. The wind turbine 
industry was a manufacturing industry, which might bring immediate tax revenues and create 
jobs in the local economy. Although it might not contribute to environmental improvement 
and climate mitigation directly, the wind turbine industry was ‘framed’ by many local 
governments as the core of wind energy development. On the contrary, wind farm 
construction and operation represented a new business model that normally needed a much 
longer payback period. Wind farm operation occupied large areas of land and required 
limited labour input for maintenance. Economically, wind farm operation would not bring 
short-term benefits to the local economy. Therefore, the tension between central policy 
formulation and local implementation was even higher than in solar energy. It is not 
surprising, then, to observe a higher degree of interests mismatching between the two 
entities in this case.  
Besides local government, the involvement of a larger number of stakeholders in the wind 
story further complicated the implementation process. The state grid, as an additional 
stakeholder, played a critical role. Firms built a closer relationship with local government who 
represented their interests in policy implementation. In this sense, wind energy 
implementation was not only a bargaining process between central and local governments 
but also involved actors in the private sector and specialised agencies such as the state grid. 
5.3.2  ‘Policy bundling’ or ‘policy reinterpretation’? 
As more data and cases are reported, there is wider acceptance of the complexity of the 
climate policymaking process and its implementation. Unlike oversimplified models of top-
down or bottom-up decision making, Harrison and Kostka (2012) found the power of 
bargaining and collaboration between the local and central government: 
In China, a system where decentralization and authoritarianism work hand in hand, 
the state provides ‘signals’ of its policy preferences by setting incentives and rewards 
for local officials. These include regular binding targets with concrete figures, 
incentives such as promotion and bonus payments through an annual evaluation 
system and punishments such as redeployment to a remote region. These ensure 
that officials at every level have incentives to at least partially fulfil national mandates 
from Beijing. 
(Harrison and Kostka 2012: 4) 
The policy implementation process of Chinese climate policy could be explained as an 
interest bundling and policy bundling process.  
This report found that ‘the interest bundling’ theory requires the implementation analysis to 
go one step further – to decompose implementation into different actions. The successful 
degree of policy implementation could be measured by the success of the implementation of 
these different actions. 
In our research, we further explored this policy process. When we check the policy 
outcomes, it shows that many interests/policy goals had been included when the policy was 
implemented. In this sense, the bundling theory was correct: local government and other 
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stakeholders did put their preference into the policy either at policy design stage (e.g. 
Jiuquan government lobbied the central government to smoothen wind electricity sales) or at 
the implementation stage (e.g. Jiuquan government required bidding firms to have local 
manufacture plants). Yet, if we check the process in detail, this report reveals that the 
bundling process was not simply ‘adding up different interests’, rather, there was a ‘re-
interpretation’ process of the central policy at local level.  
In the wind case, central government expressed its policy goal and preference clearly in the 
policy documents. Local government, while administratively complying with the central policy, 
developed additional implementation requirements (e.g. local taxation) and new pace of the 
implementation (e.g. construction to be faster than central planning requirements). Central 
government did not agree to some of these additional requirements. This central–local 
bargaining happened not at the policy design process, but rather at the implementation 
stage.  
When interests of central government and local government matched with each other, there 
was no need to reinterpret central policy, and we can observe a smooth process of 
implementation. As in the solar case, this report found that the degree of interest matching 
influenced policy implementation in the wind case. The degree of interest matching across 
stakeholders, especially among central government, local government and the wind energy 
industry, determined the relative ease with which the policy was implemented.  
The drive for reinterpretation of policy came from local interests. In our framework, these 
local interests are represented by the local government and local industries as well as the 
interests that are the basis of their relationships. Jiuquan city built a close relationship with 
wind energy manufacturers and wind farms. Since the city mainly relied on the wind industry 
to develop, the local government made it strategically important. This close tie between the 
city and local business was enough to motivate the local government even in the absence of 
short-term benefits.  
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6  Conclusions and discussion 
 
To answer the question of who drives or obstructs climate change policies in China, this 
report compiled two case studies on renewable energy in China. After identifying the key 
stakeholders in each case, the report linked the stakeholder’s key interests with their actions 
in policy implementation. As the two selected cases occurred within similar time periods 
within a country, they are probably comparable to each other.  
6.1  Who drives and who obstructs climate policy? Every 
stakeholder does 
The real climate policy design and implementation process is much more complicated than 
has been reported in the existing literature. This research does not find a single entity that is 
totally active or totally passive towards climate policy. Each entity is positively inclined 
towards certain aspects of the policy and influences policy design or implementation 
accordingly. Central government, for example, promoted both solar and wind policy, but 
delayed the effort to connect wind farms to the national grid. Therefore, while the central 
government initiated the project, it also created stumbling blocks in its implementation at the 
local level. The city governments welcomed the development of emerging industries at the 
local level, yet they rejected the policy effort if it did not allow them to make short-term profits. 
So local governments, in the solar and wind cases, lobbied for amendments in the policy in 
order to align the outcome of such policies to their interests. 
These observations highlight that we need to decompose climate policy design and 
implementation into detailed goals and actions to answer the question of who drives or 
obstructs climate policy in China. Our analysis suggests that each stakeholder’s interests 
and the degree of matching among different interests for each policy goal and each policy 
action need to be explored as a part of the political economy analysis.  
The key contribution of this report lies in the fact that it provides a better understanding of the 
policy implementation process. We have shown the importance of distinguishing between 
passive and active local authorities. What drives the latter is not climate considerations but 
ambitions to accelerate economic development: building competitive local industries, creating 
jobs and, above all, increasing local tax revenue. Our case material from both the solar and 
the wind cases have shown this clearly. 
We also conclude that industrial development goals motivate both central government and 
local government to develop climate policy. The development of low-carbon industries in the 
wind and solar sector allow the fulfilment of climate-related goals of the central government 
and the local development needs of the local government. Both cases indicate that when 
core interests are at stake, both local and central government would push for policy 
adjustments or amendments. This explains why central government terminated the Golden 
Sun Project, but continues to push the wind farm base project.  
6.2  ‘Conflicting interests’ varied at policy design and 
implementation stage  
In both cases, we distinguish between policy formulation and implementation. Policy 
formulation (at the national level) is motivated by climate change, yet the chosen policy 
instrument lies more in industrial policy. In the case of solar policy, the initiatives and 
programmes have been driven by the need to establish a new and competitive industry. 
Although recently the policy goals have also incorporated domestic energy capacity 
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consideration, the focus is largely on industrial development. In the case of wind, energy 
security has been a major driver for central policy design, but the policy goal switched to 
building a competitive wind turbine industry during the implementation stage. Our analysis of 
both the cases suggests that although policies were designed in response to climate change, 
climate change mitigation was at best a co-benefit. Other considerations such as industrial 
development, enhanced competitiveness, tax revenues and profits drove the implementation 
of these policies by the stakeholders.  
Interests matter at the stage of policy implementation as well. Although local governments 
have limited influence on the policymaking process, they are responsible for implementing 
the policy. Therefore, they either passively implement (non-favoured policies) or lobby the 
central government actively to amend policies so that they are aligned to their interests.  
Such shifts in interests may lead to implementation barriers, as shown in our cases. But they 
are useful for breaking the mismatch of interests as well. In the Chinese policymaking 
process, interest bargaining normally happens during the implementation process and not at 
the policy formulation process. 
6.3  More stakeholders emerged in climate policy design and 
implementation 
This research reports two cases with a lot in common but also reveals certain differences. 
While the outcomes of the solar energy case are clearly driven by the divergent interests of 
two key actors (the local and central government), the wind energy case involves a wider 
range of actors beyond the local and central government. However, the complicated policy 
implementation process involving several stakeholders with divergent interests is common to 
both cases.  
Our analysis also suggests that new industry players emerge during the implementation 
process. These new entrants pay great attention to government actions of reallocating 
resources among stakeholders. The relationship between the government and these new 
stakeholders becomes even more complex due to the dynamic changes in their interests 
during the policy implementation process. Understanding these dynamics is critical for 
researchers to characterise the evolution of the policy implementation process. Facing a 
similar situation of losing short-term local taxation, the local governments of Jiuquan and 
Dingzhou had radically different responses. While the local government of Jiuquan was 
extremely active, the local government in Dingzhou reacted passively. This difference in 
approaches lead to substantively different outcomes and benefits for the local economy. 
Similarly, the effort to influence policy amendments were markedly different across the two 
local governments. While Jiuquan lobbied aggressively for amendments so that they could 
be aligned to its own interests, Dingzhou did not make attempts to realign the policies 
towards its own interests. In addition, the key stakeholders who drove the implementation in 
the two cases were different. The wind farm operators, who came from the local government 
in Jiuquan, were the major drivers for the implementation of the policy. Through frequent site 
visits, both the city government and provincial government officials rallied behind the 
interests of the local firms. In the case of Dingzhou, the real driver was the private sector 
company running the solar farm. It bypassed the unmotivated local government and pushed 
higher authorities to represent its interests.  
Our analysis suggests that further discussion and analysis is required in situations when 
multiple stakeholders have different or opposite interests. For example, if local government 
does not get access to higher tax revenues in the short run by implementing the policy, its 
motivation for policy implementation may decrease dramatically. This could lead to the 
emergence of obstacles in the policy implementation process. However, the emergence of 
such obstacles might not necessarily mean the failure of the policy. By using complementary 
policy instruments, such as long-term local strategic planning highlighting the trade-off 
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between short-term losses with long-term gains, the local government could be coopted in 
the policy implementation process. Therefore, a more comprehensive theoretical framework 
is needed to explain the emergence of obstacles, and how these obstacles might be 
overcome in the policy implementation process. 
6.4  Temporary coalition in policy implementation  
Beyond highlighting the complexity of the implementation process, this report also suggests 
the dynamic evolution of interests over time. Similar to the description of Harrison and Kostka 
(2012) in section 5.3.2, temporary coalitions or alliances are formed in order to fulfil the 
evolving interests of the different stakeholders. In each case, the degree to which the 
multiple stakeholders find similar interests (or not) leads to the formation of a coalition (or 
not). A firm and positive coalition drives the achievement of shared goals and pushes the 
policy implementation forward. In the solar energy case, when the local government was 
unable to gain additional tax revenues through policy implementation, motivation decreased 
dramatically. Yet this did not lead to the failure of the policy implementation process. With 
local firms to keep pushing the policy forward, Dingzhou finally executed the project 
successfully.  
In sum, our research suggests that the analysis of climate change actions in emerging 
countries such as China needs to take into account the dynamic and evolving nature of the 
policy implementation process. In order to do such an analysis in an analytically tractable 
manner, it is necessary to take an actor-oriented approach. This paper is a first attempt to 
develop a systematic approach to deal with the complex climate policy landscape.  
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Annex 1 List of interviewees 
 
Number Organisation Interview date 
LG1 Dingzhou Development and Reform Committee, Director 20.4.2013 
LG2 Dingzhou Bureau of Finance, Deputy Director 20.4.2013 
F1 Yingli Solar Co. Ltd./Dingzhou Solar Farm, Department of 
Public Affairs 
20.4.2013 
EX1 Expert 1 in solar technology, Zhao Yuwen 7.7.2013 
EX2 Expert 2 in wind technology, Gao Hu 18.7.2012 
EX3 Expert 3 in wind technology, Cui Rongqiang 12.7.2014 
EX4 Expert 4 in climate policy, Qi Ye 15.10.2014 
EX5 Expert 5 in wind in Gansu, Wang Ningbo 6.5.2012; 
25.7.2011 
PG1 Gansu Development and Reform Committee,            
Deputy Director 
6.7.2013 
LG3 Jiuquan Development and Reform Committee,          
Deputy Director 
25.7.2011; 
5.5.2012 
LG4 Jiuquan Bureau of Taxation, Director 5.5.2012 
LG5 Jiuquan New Technology Industrial Development Zone, 
Director 
5.5.2012 
LG6 Jiuquan Bureau of Science and Technology,  
Deputy Director   
5.5.2012 
F2 Yingli Solar Co. Ltd./Jiuquan Branch, Engineer 25.7.2011; 
6.5.2012 
F3 Sinovel/Jiuquan Branch, Engineer 6.5.2012 
F4 Da Tang, Yu Men Wind Farm, Chief Engineer 7.5.2012 
F5 Lan Zhou Electricity Engineering Co. Ltd., Chief Engineer 23.7.2011 
F6 State Grid, Shen Hong 7.5.2012 
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